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1. 
There is a familiar interpretation in the Anglophone literature on Nietzsche, perhaps best 
exemplified in Nehamas’s work, that regards him as concerned with advancing an individual 
project of agential unity or wholeness. In Nehamas’s version, the project consists in combining 
all our features into a harmoniously organized whole of the sort exemplified by literary 
characters (Nehamas 1985: 190-1, 195, 227).1 On this model, having a self is not something 
given but something achieved through a process whereby one creates a unity for oneself out of 
the relatively disorganized psychic multiplicity one antecedently is. 
While not all commentators subscribe to Nehamas’s particular version of this 
Nietzschean self-creating project, under which it as a matter of forging a narrative unity of the 
self, it is safe to say, I think, that most of them understand Nietzsche’s ideal to be principally a 
matter of achieving mental integration or coherence. To be sure, such mental integration will 
probably also translate itself into integrated activities in the course of a life (a life-plan), and 
should not be, therefore, construed purely as a psychic event. Still, as Janaway puts it, “the 
prevailing view is that ‘unity of the self’ is to be sought somewhere in Nietzsche’s account of the 
psyche” (Janaway 2014: 116).2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For an excellent discussion of Nehamas’s views, see the essays by Pippin (2014) and Janaway (2014), as 
well as Nehamas’s (2014) response in the recent symposium on the subject. 
2 For a sample of commentators who subscribe to different versions of this approach, see:  Schacht 
(1992); Guay (2002); Reginster (2003); Richardson (2009); Risse (2007); Gemes (2009); Poellner (2009); 
May (2009); Katsafanas (2011); Anderson (2012). In what follows I challenge this interpretative trend. 
However, given my focus on Nietzsche’s early work, it is possible to accept my account while denying 
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I do not deny that there is much to commend in this kind of approach. Preoccupation with 
it has led to important and interesting work on the vexed topic of Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the 
self and the kind of agency (or lack thereof) that he thought we could enjoy. The approach also 
has a genuine basis on texts in which Nietzsche undeniably expresses concern with the execution 
of internal psychic tasks of some kind. These include GS 335, which recommends the project of 
creating oneself by purifying one’s evaluative judgments with the help of science, and GS 290, 
which entreats us to give style to our character by reshaping our nature in accordance to an 
artistic plan that is governed by a single taste.3 
In many such passages, however, it is unclear whether achieving the mental task 
recommended is equivalent to realizing an ideal of agential wholeness. In GS 290, for instance, 
Nietzsche does not explicitly say that the task of giving style to your character springs from a 
desire to become whole, nor does he suggests that its completion satisfies such a desire. And 
while some of the language might naturally invite the notion that giving style to one’s character 
consists in integrating one’s mental economy to make it “whole”—as, for instance, when 
Nietzsche tells us that such art “is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and 
weaknesses [of their nature] … and then fit them into an artistic plan” (GS 290)—, the only thing 
explicitly suggested by the passage is that the point of character-fashioning is to attain 
satisfaction with yourself. For all Nietzsche says, that self-satisfaction could be compatible with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that it applies to Nietzsche’s mature philosophy. Still, charity requires that we read Nietzsche’s 
philosophy as continuous until proven otherwise. I doubt the burden of proving the discontinuity in the 
case of Nietzsche’s understanding of wholeness can be met. On the contrary, Nietzsche’s later 
pronouncements about wholeness make better sense, I think, in the light of my reading of the early works. 
See Zamosc 2014: 20-22. In this connection, it is also worth remembering that the mature Nietzsche 
himself held the last two Meditations in high esteem and went as far as to call the fourth a vision of his 
future and to claim that the third contained, above all, his promise (EH, Untimely Meditations, 3). While 
revising this essay for publication I stumbled upon Church’s (2015) valuable work, which in all essential 
aspects agrees with mine. He also argues for a strong continuity with respect to Nietzsche’s understanding 
of wholeness (see specially his chapter 9). 
3 For references to and abbreviations of Nietzsche’s texts see the beginning of the references section. 
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a mentally disunifed psyche. One could attain satisfaction with one’s disunity if, as GS 290 has 
it, one uses it for “distant views” as a spur meant to direct one’s future unifying efforts. As often 
happens with many of Nietzsche’s aphorisms, they are vague enough to be recruited into 
different, often opposing, readings. 
But leaving aside the issue of how to interpret such ambiguous passages, the reality is 
that if there is an ideal of agential wholeness in Nietzsche’s philosophy, explicit references to it 
in the published works are relatively scant, with one big exception: Nietzsche’s early works and, 
specifically, the Meditations, where the arguments advanced are saturated by talk of unity, 
wholeness, unanimity, totality, completeness, and the like. Here is where one finds Nietzsche 
suggesting that “we have an immensurable longing to become whole” (UM III.6, p.163). Here 
too we encounter the very important idea of culture as “unity of artistic style in all the 
expressions of the life of a people”, which prevents said people from becoming fragmented by 
“[falling] wretchedly apart into inner and outer, content and form” (UM I.1, p.15 and UM II.4, 
p.80); and we learn that believing in culture is equivalent to saying: 
‘I see above me something higher and more human than I am; let everyone help me to 
attain it, as I will help everyone who knows and suffers as I do; so that at last the man 
may appear … who in his completeness (Ganzheit) is at one with nature, the judge and 
evaluator of things’ (UM III.6, p.162-3). 
Focusing on these and the like statements, I have argued elsewhere that the Nietzschean 
ideal of wholeness does not principally concern psychic integration, as is generally believed, but 
rather is about achieving cultural integration by pursuing the ideal of freedom and humanity in 
oneself and in all (Zamosc 2014). In this essay, I develop this argument further by exploring 
affinities between Nietzsche’s ideal and Kant’s ethics. In what follows, I am going to argue that, 
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for Nietzsche, an agent becomes whole when he necessarily guides his actions (or shapes his 
outward form) in accordance with those duties that befall anyone who aspires to belong to a 
genuine culture. Said duties spring from the idea of humanity, from the image we have of 
ourselves as endowed with the capacity to be the helmsmen of our lives, the capacity to be more 
than mere animals or automata. In this way, for Nietzsche, as for Kant, the norm that should 
guide our activities is the command to take the idea that we have of ourselves as the free 
originators of our actions as the true aim of those actions.4 
My argument will proceed as follows: Section 2 succinctly recounts the main aspects of 
my interpretation of Nietzsche’s ideal of wholeness. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
Kantian ethical framework I will employ to expand our understanding of Nietzschean wholeness. 
Section 4 analyses the way Nietzsche’s ideal parallels those Kantian themes. Finally, section 5 
briefly considers how Nietzsche’s ideal of humanity differs form Kant’s own. 
 
2. 
 What, then, according to the Meditations, is the Nietzschean ideal of wholeness? Here I 
will limit myself to a broad survey of the main elements of Nietzsche’s account.5 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This claim raises the thorny issue of Nietzsche’s views on agency in ways that will seem controversial to 
some. The debate in the Anglophone literature on this topic seems divided into two main camps: on the 
one hand, those who believe that Nietzsche rejected any notion of autonomous agency on incompatibilist 
grounds, e.g. Leiter (2015) and Risse (2007); and, on the other, those who attribute to Nietzsche some 
version of compatibilism and thus of free agency, e.g. Guay (2002), Gemes (2009), Richardson (2009), 
Katsafanas (2011), Constâncio (2012); and also expressivist interpretations like those of Pippin (2010) 
and Acampora (2013). Since I am claiming that the early Nietzsche endorsed some kind of free agency 
my position aligns itself with this latter camp. However, unlike most commentators, I do not necessarily 
believe that the account of agency defended by Nietzsche must be understood in compatibilist terms or 
that he thought it needed to be reconciled with a scientific picture of the world. But this is too complex a 
topic and needs to be addressed on another occasion. German authors like Gerhardt (1992) and Stegmaier 
(1994), defend Nietzschean notions of freedom that are very much in line with—and place Nietzsche 
within—the Kantian tradition of autonomy in which I too place him. Cf. Church (2015), who also locates 
Nietzschean wholeness and freedom within this tradition. 
5 For further support of this view, see Zamosc (2014). 
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Although the Meditations tackle a multiplicity of themes, raging from issues about music, 
education, and history, to ones concerning philosophy, art, science, politics, and the like, 
underlying these diverse discussions is Nietzsche’s overarching preoccupation with the theme of 
culture. As previously indicated, at the heart of Nietzsche’s idea of culture is the problem of 
wholeness for, as the above quote has it, a culture just is the unity of a people or their capacity to 
form a single living entity in which content and form do not contradict, but rather correspond to 
one another (UM II.4, p.80).6 
Now, perhaps what is most significant about Nietzsche’s analysis of culture is that it is 
conducted from the individual’s perspective and not from an impersonal standpoint. This 
emphasis on individuality springs partly from the fact that, in Nietzsche’s thought, the theme of 
culture itself is dominated by an existentialist undercurrent concerned with the problem of the 
justification of life, a problem that, according to Nietzsche, is not addressed to mankind as a 
whole but to each individual human being who is confronted by the question: “to what end do I 
exist?” (UM II.9, p.112; UM IV.7, p.222). For Nietzsche, successfully answering the summons 
to give purpose to your life is equivalent to taking control of it and, thus, corresponds to the 
realization of a kind of agential autonomy.7 As he puts it: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Although I cannot fully explain here what this correspondence amounts to, one way to approach this 
idea is to think of a culture’s content as being composed of the individuals and the institutions operating 
within society, and of its form as the characteristic activities those people and institutions are engaged in. 
Of course, one of the principal claims of the Meditations is that freedom is what makes us genuinely 
human. So to imagine a genuine culture in which content and form correspond to one another is to 
imagine a society in which all institutions, whether political, academic, artistic, and the like, are structured 
so as to enable and encourage their participants (the individuals within society) to become free or whole 
(what they genuinely are). 
7 As I will argue in a moment, though, not every purpose will count. In fact, the early Nietzsche thinks 
that only one purpose can successfully realize our freedom: the aim of culture, which is the production of 
the genius in ourselves and in all. In effect this means that we must engage in activities that allow us to 
become self-reliant, free-thinking individuals; ones who know their true needs (i.e. those corresponding to 
their freedom) and attempt to meet them in action, all the while helping others do so as well and become 
the same. Since here I am limiting myself to a brief recount of the main elements of Nietzsche’s position, 
I cannot fully substantiate these claims. 
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The fact of our existing at all in this here-and-now must be the strongest incentive to us to 
live according to our own laws and standards … we are responsible to ourselves for our 
own existence; consequently we want to be the true helmsman of this existence and 
refuse to allow our existence to resemble a mindless act of chance (UM III.1, p.128). 
By taking on the goal of genuine culture we become free, thereby satisfying the desire to be in 
charge of our existence. This goal, according to Nietzsche, is the production of the genius in 
oneself and in all (UM III.3, p.142, 146; III.5, p.160; III.6 p.163-4, 176). But the genius itself is a 
kind of ideal or “higher” self, who represents—perhaps paradoxically—our authentic self and 
our own productive uniqueness. This is why Nietzsche suggests that our true nature does not lie 
concealed within us, but immeasurably high above us, or at least above what we usually take 
ourselves to be (UM III.1, p.129; III.6, p.163); and it is also why he insists that resolving to 
promote culture’s goal is equivalent to the “heroism of truthfulness” of one who seeks to realize 
an existence that cannot be denied and which is itself without falsehood (i.e. genuine) (UM III.4 
p.153-5). Such a truthful existence is one lived in freedom. Hence Nietzsche’s complaint against 
the hypocrisy of his age which, while commending the “free personality” to the four winds, at 
the same time ensures “that history does not make any personality ‘free’ that is to say truthful 
toward itself, truthful toward others, in both word and deed” (UM II.5, p.84).  
The link between freedom and truthfulness implies that becoming whole requires self-
knowledge: we must come to know our true (higher) selves. Initially, such self-knowledge 
manifests itself as a kind of self-alienation made audible through the voice of our conscience that 
calls to each of us: “Be your self! All you are now doing, thinking, desiring, is not you yourself” 
(UM III.1, p.127). This self-contempt is the root of all genuine culture because it awakens in us a 
profound desire for the genius (UM III.3, p.142; III.6 p.162-3; UM IV.7, p.222). This desire 
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springs from our love for our true educators, who are those great individuals who are free and 
whole, and who thereby serve as models for the kind of genius we too could one day become.8 
But this self-alienation is only the first step towards culture. It leads the person to “read off the 
aspirations of mankind as a whole” and thereby take the second step that is demanded of him by 
culture: namely, “an act, that is to say a struggle on behalf of culture and hostility towards those 
influences, habits, laws, institutions in which he fails to recognize his goal: which is the 
production of genius” (UM III.6, p.163). As we learn from Nietzsche’s discussion of Wagner, 
this act consists in an effort “to bring together into unity that which was formerly thought to be 
set irreconcilably asunder” (UM IV.5, p.214). Importantly, this means that the individual’s act 
takes the character of a struggle for unity in the world. The act, then, that makes us whole 
consists in fighting against the divisive oppositions that keep societies and individuals 
fragmented, i.e. separated from their true selves and from each other. For example, in Wagner’s 
case the struggle consisted in uniting once again language and music, which, having been torn 
asunder in the culture, served only to confuse our feelings, thereby making us incapable of 
finding our true selves and becoming free (i.e. of hearing the summons to realize the genius in 
ourselves and in all).9 The individual’s struggle, then, is an outward directed struggle for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Thus, Nietzsche’s joy at discovering in Schopenhauer “a whole (ganzes), complete, self-moving, 
unconstrained and unhampered natural being” (UM III.2, p.136). 
9 See Zamosc 2014: 14-17. It is worth emphasizing that although, under this scenario, in their struggle to 
unify themselves people can pursue different aims, some artistic, some political, some philosophical, and 
so on, those different aims cannot really conflict because they are all guided by the overarching aim of 
fighting against the things in the world that stand in the way of the goal of culture, which is the 
production of the genius (of individual wholeness) in oneself and in all (UM III.3, p.142; III.5, p.160; 
III.6, p.163-4, 176). Thus, all these disparate aims will converge and, in the end, will lead to a 
suprapersonal collective unity (what Nietzsche calls the republic of genius) organized and integrated 
around the ideal of human freedom. 
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wholeness in the world, for the perfecting of autonomy, or, as I will argue shortly, of our 
humanity.10 
Thus, wholeness is not a matter of harmonizing the various elements in an agent’s mental 
economy.11 Instead, it consists in the correspondence between a person’s innermost nature 
(loosely: his free agency) and his external form (loosely: his actions); a correspondence that is 
genuinely achieved when the person is guided by the ideal of making the world whole, of 
engaging in acts that seek to preserve or bring about that higher community of geniuses that 
Nietzsche calls genuine culture, thereby unifying all of humanity. We get further confirmation of 
this reading if we reflect on Nietzsche’s claim that one’s true inner or “higher” nature is 
something “completely incapable of being educated or formed … your educators can only be 
your liberators… Culture is liberation” (UM III.1, p.129-30). I take the claim that one’s true 
nature cannot be formed as indicating that making ourselves whole is not about organizing our 
mental or spiritual furniture, but instead about making our mind organize the external world, 
something that can only happen when we liberate that productive uniqueness at the heart of our 
spirit by pursuing the ideal of culture: the production of the genius in ourselves and in all. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The great man, Nietzsche tells us “is contending against those aspects of his age that prevent him from 
being great, which means, in his case, being free and entirely (ganz) himself” (UM III.3, p.145). 
11 I grant that, on the account provided, it is still possible that such mental harmony might be a common 
result of achieving wholeness, but the important point is that it need not be and that wholeness does not 
necessarily consist in its realization. In this regard I detect an important difference (though mostly of 
emphasis) between my account and that of Church, who displays a tendency to characterize the 
achievement of wholeness and perfection in the genius as being principally a matter of embodying a 
beautiful type of free person: one in which drives, desires, beliefs, and such are made to cohere and 
harmonize in an exemplary way that synthesizes within oneself the experiences of humanity (e.g. Church 
2015: 74, 77, 83, 164-5). Again, in my view, Nietzsche’s emphasis is less on this kind of internal 
harmony than in the correspondence between a person’s innermost essence or freedom, and his actions in 
the world. Said actions should be, thus, expressive of much more than just the person’s attempt to 
transform his own personality and way of life; they should principally manifest his efforts to transform 
the actual world so as to bring about societies, institutions, works, laws, etc., that can actually foment 
freedom (his own and that of others as well). 
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Wholeness, then, is a matter of manifesting our free personality outwardly; it is about a kind of 
coherence between our autonomous (higher) self and its bodily movements.12 
I now want to further develop this picture by focusing on the way in which Nietzschean 
wholeness integrates notions of freedom and necessity. According to Nietzsche, the realization of 
wholeness coincides with the realization of “the true concept of form as shape necessitated by 
content, which has nothing to do with ‘pleasing’ or ‘displeasing’ precisely because it is 
necessary and not arbitrary” (UM IV.5, p.216; emphasis added). I take this definition of genuine 
form to imply that the unity characteristic of wholeness is realized through a process whereby the 
person’s content comes to necessarily govern or guide the shaping of his outward form. But what 
type of necessity is this? I suggest that we should think of it as a type of normative or practical 
necessity of the sort encountered in Kant’s moral philosophy. To be clear: in pursuing this 
comparative strategy I am not trying to establish a direct causal link.13 My aim is not to argue 
that Kant actually influenced Nietzsche, but to explore resonances between the outlooks of these 
two philosophers by using the Kantian moral framework as a foil with which to better understand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In this respect, I am in agreement with Tanesini’s claim that what is characteristic of the type of 
wholeness at stake in Nietzschean self-constitution is its diachronic dimension: our ability to rationally 
govern future behavior and engage in temporally unified activities (Tanesini 2012: 654, 658-64). Still, 
Tanesini’s account is too wedded to a psychologistic understanding of unity as simply a matter of 
integrating an agent’s personal preferences and desires over time. Accordingly, she fails to notice that the 
type of norm that Nietzsche thinks guides our future behavior when we become whole, while not exactly 
equivalent to Kant’s Categorical Imperative, is nonetheless—contrary to what she claims—
universalizable to all agents since it consists in the ideal of humanity or free agency itself (2012: 663). 
13 For a good discussion of Nietzsche’s knowledge of Kant, see Bobjer (2008). Bobjer claims that there is 
no strong evidence that Nietzsche read Kant directly, though he read at least the Third Critique while 
planning a dissertation on the topic (Bobjer 2008: 36-40). Many commentators have explored the 
relations between Kant and Nietzsche, focusing often on the metaphysics/epistemology angle, e.g. Green 
(2002). Others, like Hill (2003) also emphasize connections along an ethical axis. However, Hill claims 
that young Nietzsche was not interested in Kant’s ethics and that his engagement with it in his mature 
phase is mostly antagonistic (Hill 2003: 23, 26, 111). Again, while I am not trying to establish this kind of 
connection, to the extend that my account uncovers real resonances between Nietzsche’s position and 
ethical Kantianism, it provides circumstantial evidence suggesting—contra Hill—a real Nietzschean 
engagement, whether directly or indirectly, with Kantian ethics at the early stage. For a relatively recent 
collection of essays in German exploring various aspects of the relation between Nietzsche and Kant, see 
Himmelmann (2005a). 
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what Nietzsche is saying. In order, then, to explore this connection we must take a brief detour 
into Kant’s ethics.14 
 
3. 
As is well known, for Kant, the moral law is a categorical imperative involving a type of 
necessity he described as inescapable and unconditional, a transgression of which is ultimately a 
disrespect for oneself as an autonomous individual. This feature of the moral law distinguishes 
the commands of morality, which Kant calls our duties, from commands of prudence: “Giving 
counsel”, he tells us in the Groundwork, “does involve necessity, which, however, can hold only 
under a subjective and contingent condition […] the categorical imperative, on the contrary, is 
limited by no condition and, as absolutely although practically necessary, can be called quite 
strictly a command” (4:416, 69).15 This partly means that only by following the dictates of the 
moral law can agents act in ways that are not subject to the whimsical arbitration of their sensible 
natures. The commands of prudence, after all, also seem practically necessary: they confront the 
agent with a force that he cannot contravene on pain of not getting what he wants. Thus, if I want 
to make friends, I am required not to go about insulting people. But the necessity of not insulting 
others holds sway for me only if I am amicably disposed, a condition that is entirely contingent 
on historical (and presumably also biological) factors that have shaped my sensibility, the total 
collection of my likes and dislikes. Accordingly, for Kant, the “necessity” of the counsels of 
prudence turns out not to be really practically necessary, since it rests on arbitrary features of the 
agent that result from chance and dumb luck. In the case of the moral law, by contrast, the agent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The following reconstruction of the Kantian view borrows from work done by Velleman (2006) on the 
subject. 
15 The references to Kant’s works are, first, to the standard Academic Edition, and then, to the page 
number in the Cambridge Texts edition. 
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feels necessitated to action in a way that he cannot forestall, either by recognizing that he himself 
happens not to have the disposition required to fulfill the moral command (i.e. that he is not 
inclined in its direction), or by thinking of the command itself as grounded on such a subjective 
condition, and, therefore, as not being really objectively required of all agents (4:420, 72). 
In the previous paragraph I suggested that for Kant a person’s sensibility is contingent 
because it rests on chance historical features that could have been different. But strictly speaking, 
of course, those features are not truly contingent, even for Kant, since they are in fact the result 
of causal mechanisms operating in nature and are, thus, governed by deterministic laws that 
make it, metaphysically speaking, impossible for them to have been otherwise. From a Kantian 
perspective, the sensible constitution of the agent is part of the phenomenal world of experience 
and must be regarded, by the understanding, as subject to the same sort of deterministic 
mechanisms that it uses to have knowledge of the workings of nature in general. How, then, can 
Kant claim that acting on the basis of one’s sensibility is tantamount to acting on a contingent 
condition? Is this only rhetorical flourish on his part?—Maybe not. 
The answer to the problem, I think, is found in the realization that, when Kant speaks 
about the contingency of our sensible nature and the counsels of prudence, he is doing so from 
the standpoint of our practical, rather than our theoretical, reason. Only from the perspective of 
an agent that is trying to figure out what he has most reason to do, can the subjective conditions 
of one’s sensible makeup seem contingent.16  The reason is that, when an agent engages in 
practical reflection, he appears to stand in a place that is detached from his particular set of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This formulation is merely for expository purposes and not meant to suggest that agents engaged in 
practical reflection must necessarily pose this question to themselves whenever they act. I agree with 
Velleman’s view that practical reflection is a multitasking faculty; a view that strikes me as quite kindred 
in spirit to Nietzsche’s own philosophical positions, which depict phenomena like the will as unities only 
in word (BGE 19). Sometimes this faculty takes on the role of deliberating explicitly about what to do, 
but sometimes it may simply oversee the action, or at other times it might criticize it, or yet at others 
perform any other number of reflective functions. 
	   Zamosc-­‐Nietzschean	  Wholeness—12	  
desires and motivations, and from which he can appraise and evaluate them.  From that 
standpoint, he seems capable—at least in his own eyes—of disavowing any of his motivations, 
partly because he can imagine himself as having a different sensibility from the one that he 
actually has. Because he can reflectively question the support his desires lend to some particular 
course of action, the agent seems capable of withdrawing his own support to those desires, by 
refusing to be moved by them, or—on the contrary—capable of adding his own support to them 
by acquiescing to be moved in the direction they incline him toward.17 An agent inhabiting the 
practical standpoint seems capable of deciding whether he wants to be moved by his desires or 
not. But on the basis of what will he make up his mind? On the basis of some evaluative 
assessment of the merits and demerits of the desires in question and the action they recommend. 
The problem, of course, is figuring out the type of assessment needed here and, in particular, 
why it could not be one that simply harkens back to the assessments the agent’s own desires 
themselves seem to embody. The desires, after all, could be understood as giving the agent an 
evaluative judgment that recommends the action they incline him toward by showing it to be 
something that would be good or pleasant to do.18 Could not the agent’s evaluative assessment 
simply consist of his weighing of the various value judgments represented by his desires, in order 
to figure out which of them presses against his mind more forcefully, and then acting in a manner 
that is consequent with his recognition of its greater weight? In that case, whatever the agent has 
most reason to do would be simply equivalent to whatever the desire that impresses itself most 
forcefully to his reflective awareness is recommending that he do. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Cf. Velleman’s “What Happens When Someone Acts?” in Velleman (2000). 
18 I do not mean to necessarily endorse this way of rendering desires. I adopt this formulation for the 
purpose of explaining what I take to be at stake in the Kantian view. For an account that endorses this 
way of conceptualizing desires, see “Intending” in Davidson 1980; and for one that opposes it, see “The 
Guise of the Good” in Velleman (2000). 
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 The reason this will not suffice, for Kant, is that it would make the evaluative assessment 
of the agent purely subjective, i.e. governed by criteria that apply only to him. But practical 
reflection does not call for this kind of assessment—or so Kant thinks. Instead, from the 
standpoint of practical reflection, the agent can be regarded as facing a tribunal of sorts to whom 
he must justify his course of action. For this tribunal of reason, which Kant also calls the 
conscience,19 the agent’s answer that what he has most reason to do is whatever the strongest 
desire tells him to do will seem deficient. It would be analogous to a child who answers the 
parent’s query, “why did you hit the dog?” with a “because I felt like it”. The parent is searching 
for the reason why the child thinks that hitting dogs in this or in any other case is okay. The 
child’s answer, that it is okay because he felt like it, is the wrong sort of answer to give to this 
parental authority. It makes the child’s hitting of the dog, in the parent’s eyes, purely arbitrary 
and the resulting action capricious. For Kant, the agent stands, with respect to himself, in 
something like the relation that a parent stands in with respect to his child. The agent is 
possessed of an authoritative voice that, on some occasions at least, asks him about the 
justification for his proposed (or actual) course of action, and for whom an answer of the sort 
“because I feel like it” would hardly suffice. This means that the sort of justification an agent is 
looking for, when he speaks to himself in this voice, is one that should stand the scrutiny of other 
agents and, therefore, be public and not simply private in nature. But this means that the 
evaluative assessment we are looking for is one that should yield answers that are objective and 
universally valid for all agents, including ones that might not find themselves with the same type 
of inclinations that the person carrying out the practical reflection in this case has. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, 6:438-40, 559-62. In his essays “The Voice of Conscience” and “A 
Rational Superego”, Velleman defends an account that reconstructs, with the help of Freudian ideas, 
Kant’s categorical imperative as the voice of conscience; see Velleman (2006). 
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For Kant, the only thing that can provide this sort of criterion is the moral law. It is this 
feature that makes the necessity of the moral law’s commands rational in kind, as opposed to 
being simply a species of causal necessitation of the sort operative in nature. The necessity, after 
all, is derived from objective laws that reason recognizes as authoritative for all, and not from 
mere empirical antecedent conditions of the sort discoverable by scientific observation. That is 
why, in the Kantian view, the categorical imperative is intimately bound up with the notion of 
autonomy, and, in particular, with the notion of acting on principles that the agent has placed 
himself under, by recognizing that they are authoritative for all agents (principles that are self-
legislated). Indeed, according to Kant, the moral law presupposes the agent’s autonomy: even 
though the agent can recognize that something is rationally necessary, or inescapably required of 
him by force of reason, it does not automatically follow that he will necessarily do it; he must 
freely choose to follow the commands of the moral law, and he can fail to do so. This would be 
impossible if the moral law were simply a species of the sort of causal laws operative in nature, 
for in that case the requirements of reason would be causally necessary, and following them 
would be thereby immediately entailed: i.e., it would be entailed that one will actually do as they 
say one ought to do. 
 
4.  
But let us not stray too far afield. My purpose in digressing into Kant’s views was only to 
use them to help us understand the sort of necessity that Nietzsche thinks is involved in the 
definition of genuine form as a shape that is necessitated by content. Previously I suggested that 
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this statement implies a kind of necessitation that bears close resemblances to Kant’s notion of 
normative or practical necessity.20 
In what sense, then, is Nietzsche’s usage of “necessity” in this context similar to Kant’s? 
In answer to this question, notice, first, that Nietzsche’s definition of genuine form echoes an 
important idea contained in the Kantian view. Prior to giving us his definition, Nietzsche says 
that it is the antithesis of the common understanding of form as mere pleasing appearance (UM 
IV.5, p.216). But this latter notion of form consists in the idea that the individual’s activity 
should be shaped by the likes and dislikes of society, religion, national culture, the state, or any 
other such source of authority. It is the form that is demanded by such authorities if the 
individual is to be allowed standing within their inner circle of activities and not be expelled or 
denied entrance altogether. But this means that they ground an individual’s form arbitrarily in 
something like the Kantian sense just discussed: the form that they demand from their subjects 
rests on historically contingent factors that have whimsically structured the sensible makeup of 
these authorities. Even though their demands have the force of “necessity”, they are strictly 
speaking not truly necessary since the person can realize that they are not objectively required of 
all, but only of those who happen to want to continue to subject themselves to the authorities that 
issue them. In that sense, they are like the counsels of prudence that Kant thinks are “necessary” 
only so to speak. 
Obviously, from this Nietzschean standpoint, similar considerations should lead us to 
conclude that our own inclinations and aversions are equally suspect and do not serve as a 
legitimate basis on which to ground our activities. Not only are those inclinations the result of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 In this respect I disagree with Rutherford’s claim that Nietzsche sought to distance himself from the 
Kantian understanding of autonomy by incorporating into his own version of it notions of “fatalism” and 
“universal necessity” (see Rutherford 2011: 513). On the contrary, Nietzsche’s use of “necessity” in this 
context draws him close to Kant, whether intentionally or not. 
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biological and historical processes (many of which are culturally shaped), thus making them 
subject to the purely contingent nature of becoming, but they are also the things that bind us to 
that aspect of our being that, in the Meditations, we are being tasked to transcend precisely by 
pursuing the goal of culture: namely, our animality (UM III.4, p.150; III.5, p.157-8). Insofar as 
our inclinations have not yet been restructured with an eye to what belongs more truthfully to us 
(i.e.—as I will argue shortly—our humanity or free agency), they provide measures that, should 
we follow them, would make our lives false and inauthentic.21 Thus, a Nietzschean should arrive 
at the same sort of position attributed to Kant: that of seeing a person’s sensibility as providing 
reasons for the agent to act, but not necessarily as providing definitive reasons. Just like the 
external authorities, these internal authorities are contingently subjective and cannot, by 
themselves, ground demands that would hold for all agents. 22 The necessity of their commands 
can be at any moment called into doubt. 
 Given the ubiquity and apparent inescapability of these various authorities, an agent who 
realizes their contingent nature could feel that he has been placed in an existential bind: he might 
see himself as subject to the whimsical arbitration of authorities that could have been different, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 It is in the light of these remarks that we should interpret Nietzsche’s statements in the important 
passage in UM III.4 that includes the following phrase: “In becoming, everything is hollow, deceptive, 
shallow and worthy of our contempt; the enigma which man is to resolve he can resolve only in being, in 
being thus and not otherwise, in the imperishable” (UM III.4, p.155). A bit further down Nietzsche writes: 
“the heroic human being despises his happiness and his unhappiness” (ibid.); here we can read: his own 
likes and dislikes. 
22 By putting it this way, I do not mean to suggest that for Nietzsche the quest for wholeness requires that 
the agent follow an abstract, impersonal formula of universality, in the way Kant requires. The 
universality expressed here is arrived at in a derivative manner from a duty that is profoundly personal: 
the quest for wholeness, which is a quest to organize our activities around that aspect of our being that is 
essential to our personality (i.e. necessary). But, since, as will be argued bellow, this aspect turns out to be 
our freedom or our humanity, it is one that belongs essentially to anyone capable of autonomous self-
governance. Thus the demand to become whole holds for a person irrespective of his historical, 
biological, or cultural particularities, and, in this way, it is one that would hold for any and all agents. 
This formal (universal) demand, however, will be differentially realized according to each person’s 
talents. In that way it also betrays its fundamentally personal character. Some, like Wagner, will become 
whole by creating music in which genuine feeling is made audible again, others might pursue political 
conquests of unification or transvalue values, and so on. See Zamosc 2014: 27-8, n31. 
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and whose demands are questionable in principle, and, yet, somehow unable to escape their 
jurisdiction (i.e. enslaved to them) and therefore condemned to model his pursuits in accordance 
with their dictates. In this way, he might come to the realization that his life is not really in his 
own hands, and is, therefore, devoid of significance. His life might then become, in his own eyes, 
absurd and meaningless, a mindless act of chance. 
How can a person avoid this result and make his activities follow from demands that are 
truly necessary and not arbitrary? How can he achieve a real unity of content and form? Here, 
again, Nietzsche’s answer bears some interesting similarities with the Kantian framework. For he 
suggests that the requisite necessity is provided by the agent’s recognition of what Nietzsche 
calls a new circle of duties, and his resolve to guide his activities in response to them. As he puts 
it: 
These new duties are not the duties of a solitary; on the contrary, they set one in the midst 
of a mighty community held together, not by external forms and regulations, but by a 
fundamental idea. It is the idea of culture, insofar as it sets for each one of us but one 
task: to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and 
without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature (UM III.5, p.160; the stress 
within the italicized phrase is mine). 
In this passage, Nietzsche suggests that the new duties that the agent recognizes as required of 
him, spring from an idea, or—perhaps better put—from an ideal that the person recognizes as 
authoritative for him in a way that the demands of the external authorities I mentioned earlier 
(including that of his own egoistic sensibility) are not. This is, I think, what makes the necessity 
of their commands rational, in a way that parallels the Kantian sense outlined above: they are 
commands that the person recognizes as objectively required of everyone, thus, also of himself, 
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no matter what; i.e., no matter what sensible makeup he happens to have, or what age he is born 
into, or under what nation state, native culture or society he happens to find himself living, and 
so on. These duties provide a rational guidance that the agent feels he must not forestall, 
provided he is thinking clearly and acting consequently with his recognition that the ideal that 
they spring from is one that he cannot fail to have. The agent’s recognition of these duties and 
his attempt to meet them in action, in his activities, would be then what makes him unified and 
whole. 
 But what is this ideal, and why can the agent not fail to have it? Although not 
immediately apparent in the passage I quoted, the short answer is that it is the ideal of autonomy 
itself, what Nietzsche in these works calls the genius and what he sometimes also refers to as 
humanity, for instance, in this other passage where he disparages of the dangers that stand in the 
way of this ideal and asks: 
Who is there then, amid these dangers of our era, to guard and champion humanity, the 
inviolable sacred treasure gradually accumulated by the most various races? Who will set 
up the image of man when all men feel in themselves only the self-seeking worm and 
currish fear and have thus declined from that image to the level of the animals and even 
of automata? (UM III.4, p.150). 
The parallel to Kant, I hope, should again be evident.23 For Kant thought that the ideal of 
autonomy was also equivalent to the ideal of humanity as an end in itself. Whether deliberatively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Notice, again, that the quote suggests that what is characteristic of Nietzschean autonomy is not just its 
opposition to automatism, but also to animality. This once more reinforces the connection to Kantian 
themes: as in Kant, the type of freedom characteristic of us is one that is often exercised in opposition to 
animal inclinations, which is partly why Nietzsche thinks that it can redeem nature “from the curse of the 
life of the animal” (UM III.5, p.157-8). Hill claims that Nietzsche thought that there was something 
fundamentally right about this aspect of Kant’s account of agency (Hill 2003: 217), but since he has a 
blind spot about early Nietzsche’s possible engagement with ethical Kantianism (see note 13), he cannot 
detect the presence of this theme in the early works, and fails to see that Nietzsche’s views appear to be 
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or not, Nietzsche seems to be following in these Kantian footsteps and arguing that the requisite 
necessity we have been searching for is to be found in our idea of ourselves as endowed with 
personhood, with the capacity to be the helmsmen of our lives, the capacity to rise above and be 
more than mere animals or automata.24 
 Earlier I claimed that, from the standpoint of practical reflection, our sensible makeup has 
a purely contingent status partly because we can imagine having desires different from those we 
actually have, so we must realize that our desires cannot provide us with definitive reason for 
doing what they incline us to do; we ourselves must come to their aid (or, on the contrary, 
oppose them) on the basis of our evaluative assessment of their worth as motives for action. I am 
now claiming that, for Nietzsche, as for Kant, the criterion on which we conduct this assessment 
is our ideal of humanity, or our idea of ourselves as autonomous. The norm that can guide 
reflection, and our evaluative assessment of our motives, is the command to take the idea that we 
have of ourselves as free originators of our actions, as the true aim (or, perhaps, at the very least, 
as part of the aim) of those actions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
continuously affirmed throughout his philosophical development (e.g. in GM III.6-8 where Nietzsche 
discusses the good side of the ascetic denial of sensuality as a bridge to independence). Assuming this 
continuity, my account is obviously at odds with Risse’s (2005 and 2007) defense of a Nietzschean 
freedom that reasserts an animal psychologism that is completely hostile to Kantian autonomy. But, my 
view is also opposed to that of commentators like Sachs and Katsafanas, who, while defending positions 
that are friendlier towards autonomy, see in Nietzsche a rejection of the Kantian model that puts 
autonomy in conflict with animality or sensuality (see Sachs 2008: 95-6 and Katsafanas 2011: 103). 
24 Since I take Nietzsche’s views on freedom to be largely continuous throughout his philosophical 
trajectory (see previous note), I disagree with Hutter’s suggestion that Nietzsche’s rejection of the 
dualism between nature and reason in favor of a stricter natural monism constitutes the real turning point 
between his early and late philosophy (see Hutter 2005: 153). Of course, the clash against animality in the 
early (and the late) Nietzsche should not be understood “transcendentally”, in the way Hutter tends to 
characterize it when he presents it as the real weakness in Nietzsche’s early thought (2005: 157-8). The 
redemption of nature that is achieved with the use of our reason and “against” our animality, constitutes a 
“divinization” of nature that, in good Dionysian fashion, springs from within nature itself and is not 
derived from some transcendental realm located outside of nature. For both the early and the late 
Nietzsche, to be “no-longer-animal” does not mean to be “no-longer-natural”. 
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 But could we not also stand in a logical space apart from our autonomy and imaginatively 
see ourselves as deprived of it, say, by thinking of ourselves as dogs or simply as aliens from 
outer space that lack humanity? And does that not mean that our humanity too is contingent, 
after all, and not really the source of the requisite necessity we are looking for? There are 
different ways to answer these questions. One could be to note that when an agent imagines that 
his sensible constitution might have been different, what he is imagining is that he could have 
been a different agent from the one that he knows himself to be. But when a person imagines that 
he is or could have been a dog, what is he imagining? Perhaps he is simply imagining himself as 
a four-legged creature that enjoys doing things characteristic of the canine species. But he could 
also be imagining that he is doing those things while endowed with a stream of self-reflection 
that allows him to imaginatively entertain different conceptions of himself, including the 
conception that he is not a dog but his owner instead. In that case, the person would be imagining 
that the dog is capable of asking questions about what he has most reason to do, i.e., that he is 
capable of practical reflection; but then what the agent is imagining is not a dog, after all, but 
rather a person entrapped in the body of a dog. He has, for all effects and purposes, endowed the 
dog with humanity and with the concurrent ideal of autonomy. Perhaps such an imaginative 
performance has practical implications for an agent, but if it does, it is due to the notion of 
humanity that has been imaginatively infused into it. That is why, unlike our particular desires, 
our humanity cannot be contingent for us, but very much an essential, necessary, and, indeed, 
constitutive feature of the practical standpoint itself that we come to inhabit in our role as 
agents.25 Thus, the ideal of humanity is necessary, not because the person cannot logically 
distance himself from it, by imaginatively thinking that he lacks it, but rather because the person 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In this regard, I think that authors like Katsafanas (2013) are right in finding constitutivist elements in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy. However, if my interpretation is correct, the notion of autonomy might be 
generating more normative content in Nietzsche’s ethics than Katsafanas allows (2013: 242). 
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cannot practically escape his humanity, which will follow him like a shadow even as he actively 
tries to run away from it, say, by attempting to behave like a dog.26 The ideal is also necessary 
because in recognizing that he cannot really escape it, in the way he might be able to escape his 
desires, the person must also realize that this ideal applies to all agents insofar as they are such; 
he thus recognizes it as an ideal that is objective and universal in scope. 
Since my humanity is essential to me, guiding my outward activities so that they conform 
to it, and in particular, to the higher image of it I may entertain in my mind (to its idealized 
version), would be equivalent to guiding those activities by standards that are necessarily my 
own. In doing so, I would be refusing to let my life be the plaything of nature and of alien forces 
and become instead its helmsman: a person who organizes most of his activities around and 
aspect of his being that belongs necessarily (i.e. more truthfully) to him. In this way, my life 
would become a living unity of content and form, and everything that springs from it would 
thereby become, in Nietzsche’s terms, a piece of fate or primal law for the present and for 
everything that is yet to come, i.e. a model of autonomy that can actively bring others together 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The practical inescapability I am referring to is an ontological property of us: we cannot stop being 
human (i.e. practical reasoners) while we are alive and active in the world. We can, of course, stop being 
human in the relevant sense through things like suicide, or by falling into a coma in which the part of our 
humanity that allows us to be agents in the world shuts down, even while other parts persist. But that kind 
of escape exiles us from the space of reasons for acting one way or another: in those scenarios, there is no 
life any more that could be arbitrarily or necessarily governed by us. 
27 In UM IV.6, 221, Nietzsche connects the notion of being necessary with that of being a piece of fate or 
primal law while discussing the appearance of genuine music in his century. 
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Some may find that my reading of Nietzschean wholeness strains credulity. For one thing 
it presents us with a picture that may sound much too rationalist and universalist to be (even 
young) Nietzsche’s own. Moreover, given my emphasis on the early works, it might be thought 
that the more appropriate line of affinity is the one that runs through Schopenhauer, and not—as 
I have it— through Kant. 
While Schopenhauer’s influence on Nietzsche’s early thinking is indisputable, it is also 
often exaggerated in the literature. Moreover, in many ways Nietzsche’s early writings make use 
of Schopenhauerian terminology as a rhetorical instrument for turning Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy on its head. Fully defending this claim would take me too far afield. But, in this 
connection, it is worth emphasizing that, with respect to the Nietzschean concept of necessity I 
have analyzed here, Schopenhauer’s stance runs opposite to Nietzsche’s usage. Schopenhauer is 
hostile to the very notion of normative necessity that Nietzsche upholds in these early works. 
Indeed, a substantial part of his criticism of ethical Kantianism consists in denying Kant’s 
fundamental idea that there is a species of necessity that is as real as causal necessity, but which 
is practical in kind: the necessity of an “ought” not an “is”. For Schopenhauer, practical necessity 
is a fantastical construct, implying the contradictory notion of a necessity in which the 
inevitability of the effect could fail to appear (OBM, p.67). 
As I have shown, Nietzsche’s account in the Meditations is completely at odds with this 
Schopenhauerian posture and closer to Kant (whether intentionally or not). For Nietzsche, the 
necessary relation between a person’s content and his form is never an inevitable occurrence, but 
always a demand expressed by the agent’s conscience to which he must acquiesce out of his own 
volition (UM III.1, p.127). In line with this, Nietzsche departs from the purely passive 
conception Schopenhauer has of the conscience as a kind of self-knowledge that tells us the sort 
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of person we are condemned to be and continue being (OBM, p.196). Although the conception of 
conscience as a type of self-knowledge is not foreign to Nietzsche, he understands it, against 
Schopenhauer (and, again, in kinship to Kant), as a fundamentally active and practically efficient 
faculty: the conscience does not simply hold up to a person an image of who or what he truly 
is—in Nietzsche’s case, a free personality—it also urges him to become that thing, because he is 
in constant peril of loosing his authentic (higher) self and of becoming someone else (a 
fragmented personality). 
Again, by these remarks I do not mean to deny the real influence of Schopenhauer in the 
young Nietzsche. That influence is importantly present, among other places, in the idea that 
wholeness is a matter of transcending one’s egoistic interests and identifying with humanity’s 
interests. However, in Schopenhauer’s case, the identification is really with the metaphysical 
Will, and consists in a kind of mystical operation of the highly developed intellect through which 
it escapes its subservient role to the empirical will-to-live, and tries to redress the error of having 
entered into its individuated existence by “returning”—in ascetic self-renunciation—to the 
undifferentiated state of oneness that constitutes its more truthful being (e.g., WWR II, chs. 14-
15, 18-19, 22). Here, again, we can see Nietzsche’s ironic handling of Schopenhauerian themes. 
For, whereas Schopenhauer locates our true being in the subterranean realm of the suprapersonal 
metaphysical thing-in-itself that is the innermost essence of nature, Nietzsche locates our 
genuine self in a higher plane that transcends nature but in an upward-directed movement aimed 
at realizing nature’s own metaphysical goal, which is—in self-knowledge—to redeem itself from 
the cursed life of the animal by transfiguring itself in the aesthetically beautified form of an ideal 
humanity, of a more complete physis (i.e. of genuine culture) (UM III.5, p.157, 159, 169). In this 
way, the renunciation of the ego that Nietzsche recommends is not a denial of the will-to-live, 
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but an assertion of it in its highest form; one that—contra Schopenhauer—helps us bind 
ourselves more genuinely to life and its infinite striving, i.e., to the world of phenomena. Thus, 
unlike Schopenhauer, Nietzsche argues that the final goal of self-knowledge is not a denial of 
life, but an artistic (cultural) affirmation of it.28 
Nietzsche’s idea that our imperishable (eternal), true being is the result of our own artistic 
fashioning, provides a good segue to end our reflections by briefly considering the way in which 
Nietzschean wholeness departs from Kant’s ethics. And with this I return to the charge that the 
Nietzsche uncovered in my analysis is too much of a rationalist and universalist to count as being 
truly Nietzschean. I think that these features of Nietzsche’s position are genuinely found in the 
works discussed, but they are also greatly mitigated by his aristocratism and his 
naturalistic/historicist leanings. Although every human being possesses a dormant productive 
uniqueness (genius) that can be liberated by culture, and although we are all urged to realize the 
production of the genius first in ourselves and through ourselves in everyone (UM III.1, p.127; 
III.3, p.142-3; III.5, p.160, 162-3), it is clear from Nietzsche’s account that most individuals will 
fail to take up the goal, and that even those who strive to achieve it will only realize it with 
varying degrees of success. In this respect, I am in agreement with Bailey’s observation that 
Nietzsche’s particular brand of Kantian ethics differs from the standard version “in admitting 
different degrees of agency and therefore moral significance among agents …  thus substantially 
modifying the egalitarianism or universality standardly required by a Kantian moral judgment” 
(Bailey 2013: 151). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 It is in light of these remarks that we should understand Nietzsche’s claim in Birth that “art is the 
highest task and the true metaphysical activity of this life” (BT, Foreword; also, BT 24). A claim whose 
echoes we encounter also in the Meditations, e.g. UM II.7, p.95-96, II.10, p.120; III.1, p.127, III.5, p.157-
60, III.7, p.177-8; IV.4, p.212-3, IV.11, p.252. This is a topic for another occasion. 
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The reason for this difference is rooted, in my view, in Nietzsche’s naturalistic 
tendencies, which drive him away from the strict transcendental rationalism characteristic of 
Kant.29 For the latter thought that humanity was an ahistorical, a priori idea that was antecedently 
given to us in our practical reflection, and meant to guide it from a place unchanged and eternally 
fixed. That is why Kant seems to think that normative necessity is reducible to a kind of 
conceptual necessity and attempts to derive the content of morality from an analysis of the very 
idea of duty itself. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the notion of necessity at stake in 
wholeness, is not simply equivalent to that of conceptual necessity, and is thus not reducible to it 
in this way; and this is partly because Nietzsche is highly critical, even at this early stage in his 
philosophical career, of the overestimation of reason (more so of a concept of “pure” reason) that 
lies at the center of the German Idealist project.30 His naturalistic leanings push him towards a 
more historical understanding of the ideal of humanity. That is part of what I think he is getting 
at with the aforementioned suggestion that humanity is a “sacred treasure” that has gradually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For an interesting study of the tensions between Nietzsche’s naturalism and his transcendentalism, see 
Gardner (2009). I think that my account of Nietzschean wholeness militates somewhat against Gardner’s 
conclusion that for Nietzsche there is nothing that makes our “non-naturalistic” self-representation true 
(Gardner 2009: 28). For the Nietzsche of the Meditations, at least, our self-conception as autonomous 
represents a metaphysically “truer” version of ourselves partly because we legislate it to the world and not 
just to ourselves: our non-naturalistic self-understanding makes itself true by transforming nature so as to 
make it conform to our self-image. It constitutes, then, a type of self-knowledge that actively produces the 
facts that make it true. Perhaps this is also partly what Nietzsche means by suggesting that his Zarathustra 
is “one who first creates truth, a world-governing spirit, a destiny” (EH Zarathustra, 6). 
30 I thus disagree somewhat with Himmelmann’s claim that Nietzsche remained skeptical about the 
constructive power of reason and that his one-sided (perhaps obsessive) focus on the destructive and 
merely critical function of reason meant that he truncated and only partially realized the project of 
Enlightenment, at least as this was understood by Kant (Himmelmann 2005b: 43). In my view, Nietzsche 
has confidence in the constructive power of reason, but he wants to divest reason of the mantle of “purity” 
with which thinkers like Kant had enshrined it. In this respect, I see my position as aligned with that 
expressed by authors like Heit (2005). Rather than having an ambivalent relation to Enlightenment, as 
Himmelmann tends to portray, Nietzsche can be regarded as its radicalizer, in the sense that he sought to 
show that reason and science are profoundly entangled with and very much responsive to our human all 
too human needs. Thus, Nietzsche ultimately drives the Kantian revolution in thought forward to what 
would be its logical consequence: with the help of reason and science, to construct the world in 
accordance with our real needs and values, so that we can put an end to that rule of chance and nonsense 
that has been our history until now (see Heit 2005: 53). 
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accumulated through time and the most various races, and that there can be different images of 
personhood that are contained in this ideal (UM III.5, p.150-3). What humanity means, what 
autonomy entails, is something that has to be learned in life, and that, as a species, we have been 
learning and relearning together throughout our history. 
 In claiming that we have been learning what humanity or autonomy is, I do not simply 
mean to say that our autonomy was antecedently “out there” as a fact of nature awaiting our 
discovery in order to be employed for the guidance of our actions. I do think Nietzsche means 
something along those lines, since he thought there was a naturalistic story to be told about how 
creatures like us came to develop the capacity to be in control of ourselves, or at least to imagine 
ourselves to be so capacitated.31 But, in my view, he also means to say that we have invented our 
autonomy in the course of living up to the idea itself, and that we are constantly reinventing it 
through each successive generation. In this sense, Nietzsche’s morality incorporates an idea of 
moral development, change, and experimentation, that appears to be absent from the letter of the 
Kantian view, though it may not be altogether absent form its spirit.32 
We can now appreciate another meaning behind Nietzsche’s talk of necessity. For in 
fashioning the ideal of humanity through time and applying it, both retrospectively and 
prospectively, universally to ourselves, we are constantly wrestling this idea from chance and the 
endless, blind, unguided stream of becoming; we are, as Nietzsche would put it, perfecting nature 
in ourselves and making it necessary, by turning it into the product of our self-chosen and self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 In Zamosc (2012), I offer a reading of some of the elements in Nietzsche’s story. 
32 It is important, however, not to confuse this idea of moral development with the Hegelian 
understanding of the progressive unfolding of reason with ironclad necessity toward more perfect 
freedom, of which Nietzsche is often critical (e.g. UM II.8, pp.104-5). For him, there is no necessity of 
that sort since the process is precarious at best and is in constant peril of being derailed for each living 
generation, and perhaps of perishing from this earth. Nietzsche articulates this latter, ominous possibility 
poetically in Zarathustra through the metaphor of the “Last Man” (see, Z, Prologue 5). To be sure, even 
in the event of the ideal’s “death”, its resurrection would always be within reach for as long as humanity 
continues to exist and there are agents in the world capable of practical reflection.
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determined idealization. After nature has, by chance, blindly endowed us with autonomy, we 
wrestle the notion out of nature’s jaws and appropriate it for ourselves. We thus guide our 
actions in the world (or at least some of those actions) by an aim or purpose that is the result of 
our free fashioning and which we collectively construct, and are continually in the process of 
formulating and reformulating together. Accordingly, the pursuit of our ennobled humanity 
makes us whole because it lends a certain coherence and imperishability to our individual lives, 
by making them part of a collective project that is perpetually in the making and by means of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 I am very grateful to Paul Katsafanas for his invaluable feedback and editorial advice. Any remaining 
faults and shortcomings are exclusively my own. 
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